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In the Supre1ne Cou~t of the 
State of Utah 
ED B. SHRIVER, et al, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
I. G. BENCH, 
Provo City Recorder, 
Respondent. 
\ CASE 
( NO. 8678 
) 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an original proceeding in the Supreme Court 
asking for a writ of mandate directing the respondent to 
proceed as provided by Chapter 11, Title 20, Utah C'ode An-
notated, 1953, which is the initiative and referendum law 
of the State of Utah. 
Petitioner Ed B. Shriver, together with nine other 
sponsors, prepared and filed in the office of the Provo City 
Recorder, on the 29th day of March, 1957, an application 
for petition copies of an initiative petition for ~ ordinance 
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in Provo City, Utah. Upon advice of the Provo City Attor-
ney the respondent refused to file said petition or to proceed 
under the above cited statute on the grounds that the pro-
osed ordinance contains subject matter which is purely ad-
ministrative in its character and therefore not properly the 
subject of the initiative and referendum law. 
Petitioners on the 24th day April, 1957, filed in the 
above entitled Court their petition for alternative writ of 
mandate. To this petition respondent has filed his return 
and answer in which he has admitted all of the essential alle-
gations contained therein and has admitted that the only 
grounds of respondent's refusal to proceed under the initi-
ative and referendum law is his interpretation of the pro-
posed ordinance as being purely administrative in charac-
ter. 
This proposed ordinance is set out in the petition ver-
batim. It provides minimum annual salaries for policemen 
and firemen in Provo City, contains a pay range table, and 
provides a cost of living escalator salary adjustment plan 
tied to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of 
Labor Consumer Price Index. 
Since January 1, 1956 Provo City has been operating 
under a c:ouncil Manager Charter. The provisions of said 
Charter pertinent to this case are as follows: 
Article 10, Section 1: 
"The people continue to reserve to themselves the 
powe,rs of initiative and referendum to be exercised in 
the manner preseribed by general law." 
Article 7, Section 11: 
"'the personnel director shall prepare for the city 
manager a standard schedule of pay for each position 
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in the classified service. The city manager shall sub-
mit the pay plan· to the council with such changes as 
he deems desirable, and such plan shall take effect 
when adopted by the council or on the thirtieth day 
after it is submitted if prior thereto the council has not 
disapproved it by resolution. The pay plan adopted 
by the couneil shall include a minimum and maximum 
and such intermediate rates as may be deemed desir-
able for each class or position. Amendments to the 
pay plan may be adopted by the council from time to 
time upon recommendation of the city manager. In 
increasing or decreasing items in the. city budget, the 
council shall not increase or decrease any individual 
salary items but shall act solely with respect to classes 
of positions as established in the classification and pay 
plans. In no event shall the council reduce the salary 
of a ·Class below the minirnum or raise it above the 
maximum salary established by the pay plan except 
-by amendment of the pay plan." 
The sole issue to be decided in this proceeding is 
whether the proposed ordinance pertaining to salaries is 
legislative or purely administrative in character. 
The following points substantiate petitioners' conten-
tion that the proposed ordinance is legislative in character, 
hence, subject to the initiative and referendum law of the 
State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS A 
RESERVED POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND SHOULD 
BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVO·R OF THE 
POWER SO RESERVED. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
POINT TWO 
TH!E PRO·POSED ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO 
SALARY RAISES IS LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTER 
AND THEREFORE IS SUBJECT TO THE INITIATIVE 
AND REFERENDUM LAW. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM LAW IS A 
RESERVED POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND SHOULD 
BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVO·R OF THE 
P·OWER SO RESERVED. 
This principle has been enunciated by many jurisdic-
tions. The Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of: 
State ex rei. Sharpe vs. Hitt (1952) 
99 Northeastern (2d) 659 
uses the following language: 
"It is well settled that initiative and referendum 
provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the 
power reserved so as to promote rather than preclude 
exercise of such power, and the object clearly sought 
to be obtained should be promoted rather than pre-
vented or obstructed.'' 
There are numerous cases to the same effect, among 
which are: 
Knowlton vs. Hezmalhalch (Cal.) 
89 P. (2d) 1109 
Collins vs. City and County of San Francisco (Cal.) 
247 P. (2d) 362. (1952 
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We have foupd no cases holding a contrary view. 
We fail to find any Utah case dealing with salary raises. 
However, our Supreme Court in the case of 
Keigley vs. Bench 
97 U. 69; 89 P. (2d) 480 
has, we think, taken a liberal view of the application of Initi-
ative and Referendum Laws. In that case the ordinance in 
question was a bonding ordinance, and we feel that an ex-
amination thereof will show the same to be much more 
limited in scope and effect than the ordinance proposed by 
the petitioners herein. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme 
Court held .that the subject matter of such ordinance was 
legislative in character and hence subject to the initiative 
and referendum law. 
We feel that our Court in the Keigley case took an ex-
tremely liberal view in making the ordinance discussed 
there referable. 
The Court after enumerating many variations which 
it considered administrative finally decided that the mere 
extension of the due dates on bonds issued by Provo City 
from fiteen to twenty years was sufficient to give the ordi-
nance a legislative character. In our view, this is a liberal 
interpretation, which brings the legislation within the scope 
of the initiative and referendum law. 
POINT TWO 
THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO 
SALARY RAISES IS LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTE·R 
AND THEREFORE IS SUBJECT TO THE INITIATIVE 
AND REFEREN[)UM LAW. 
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On this question the adjudicated cases are in conflict. 
However, we feel that the more recent and the better rea-
soned cases, and the greater weight of authority are to the 
effect that salary ordinances such as the one proposed here 
are legislative in character, and are properly the subject 
of initiative and referendum laws. 
We refer the Court to the annotation contained in: 
122 A.L.R. at Page 782 and following. 
We quote the following from Page 782: 
"Thus, in Taxpayers' Assn. v. Houston, (1937) 129 
Tex. 627, 105 S. W. (2d) 655, two ordinances fixing 
minimum salaries of certain officers and employees· of 
the city adopted under the referendum provision of the 
city charter were held to be valid as being legislative 
in character and not as involving purely administra-
tive m~atters outside the purview of the referendum pro-
vision. The court in so deciding pointed out that al-
though fixing salaries might in some instances be ad-
ministrative in nature, it was legislative in character 
by reason of the public interest involved, the fixing of 
minimum salaries being but an expression of public 
policy, and in view of the fact that initiative and refer-
endum were reserved powers and not the exercise of 
specifically granted rights, provisions for their exercise 
should be libevally construed in favor of the power re-
served." 
To the same effect see: 
State ex rei. Martin vs. Eastcott 
53 S. D. 191, 220 N. W. 613 
State ex rei. Loe vs. Davis 
41 S. D. 327, 170 N. W. 519 
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State ex rei. Pike vs. Bellingham 
183 Wash. 439, 48 P. (2d) 602 
State ex rei. Mulvoy vs. Miller 
315 Mo. 41, 285 S. W. 504. 
In purusing this question into the more recent cases 
we find a number of jurisdictions with laws analogous to 
those of Utah upholding our position. 
In view of the allegations contained in respondent's re-
turn and answer it would seem that his main contention is 
that although the fixing of salaries might be legislative in 
nature yet under the particular provisions of the Provo City 
Charter it becomes an administrative function. We feel 
that a complete answer to this question may be found in 
the case of 
State ex rel. Payne vs. City of Spokane 
Wash. (1943) 134 P. (2d) 950, 
in which the court holds that the fixing of salaries is a legis-
lative act. 
Respondent in his return and answer lays great stress 
upon the wording of Section 11 of Article 7, of the Provo 
City Charter which provides that the pay plan may be adop-
ted without being approved by the City Council, and par-
ticularly the following: 
''The City Manager shall submit the pay plan to 
the Council with such changes as he deems desirable, 
and such plan shall take effect when adopted by the 
Council or on the thirtieth day after it is submitted if 
prior thereto the Council has not disapproved it by res-
olution.'' 
We feel that this particular provision in no wise pre-
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vents a salary ordinance from being legislative in character. 
Nevertheless we wish to point out that the proposed 
ordinance in question is an amendment to the ordinance 
of Provo City, and with respect to amendments Section 11 
reads as follows: 
"Amendments to the pay plan may be adopted by 
the Council from time to time upon recommendation 
of the City Manager." 
Thus there can be no question but that an amendment 
to the pay plan is a legislative matter. 
We point out that in the City of Spakane case, supra, 
the provisions of that charter were very similar ·in effect 
tQ the provisions of the Provo City charter. We quote fur-
ther from that case as follows: 
"Whether the . fixing of salaries is an administra-
tive or legislative function, -is a question upon which 
the courts are divided. See annotation g, 122 A.L.R . 
. 782. This court, however, is committed to the view 
that it is a legislative function. State ex rel. Pike v. 
Bellingham, 183 Wash. 439, 48 P. 2d 602; State ex rei. 
· Leo v. Tacoma, 194 Wash. 160, 49 P. 2d 1113. But, 
say respondents, from the very makeup of the charter, 
it is clear that the framers conceived the fixing of sal-
aries to be an administrative function in that the pro-
vision (Sec. 26) appears in the Article devoted to the 
"Administration of City Affairs." Neither generally 
nor in the particular instance can this be deemed a con-
trolling factor. In the first place, whether a function 
is legislative or administrative, is strictly a judicial 
question." 
Another recent case holding to the same effect is: 
Glass vs Smith 
244 8. W. (2d) 645 Texas (1952) 
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wherein it was held that their Civil Service Act directing 
that the Civil Service Commission shall provide for classi-
fication of all firemen and policement and that such classi-
fication shall be by ordinanee of the City Council, is not a 
limitation upon the rights of citizens under initiatory pro-
visions of the City Charter to initiate an ordinance classi-
fying policemen and firemen fixing their pay and designat-
ing holidays. 
To like effect see: 
City of Maysville vs. Kenton 
Kentucky (19-53) 
252 s .. w. (2d) 39 
where it was held that an initiative ordinance setting up 
Civil Service Commission and fixing salaries of police offi-
cers was valid and effective. 
The Supreme Court of the State of California has like-
wise held salary ordinances to be legislative in character 
and we feel that the California cases are directly in point 
with the fact situation at hand, particularly with respe-ct 
to the Charter provisions. 
We refer to: 
Spencer, et al vs. City of Alhambra (1941) 
111 P. (2d) 910. 
This was an aetion in mandamus seeking to compel the 
defendant, City of Alhambra, to carry into effect the pro-
visions of an initiative ordinance. 
In carefully reviewing this case we find many of the 
provisions in the charter of the City of Alhambra to be sim-
ilar to those in the Provo Cirty charter. We quote from 
this case as follows: 
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"The main contention of appellants is that the city 
charter provides that the compensation of all members 
of the police department, save and except the chief of 
police, shall be fixed by the city manager, who is the 
chief administrative officer of the municipality, sub-
ject to the approval of the city commission. Further, 
that because there is no requirement that such salaries 
be fixed by ordinance, the act of the cirty manager in 
fixing them is purely administrative and not legisla-
tive; and that only ordinances of a municipality which 
involve an exercise of the legiislative prerogative are 
subject to the initiative or referendum." 
Neverrtheless, the Court held that under the charter 
fixing of salaries is a legislative act and comes within the 
provisions of initiative and referendum laws. 
A similar situation is found in: 
Collins vs. City and County of San Francisco, 
a 1952 case found in 247 P. (2d) 362. 
In this case, in spite of a section of their charter ex-
cluding from the referendum process the ''Annual budget 
and appropriation ordinances, supplemental appropriation 
ordinances, the annual salary ordinance, or ordinances 
amending the same." The Court, nevertheless, held the 
salary standardization ordinance to be legislative in char-
acter subject to initiative and referendum law. 
Both of these latter cases are cited \Vith approval by 
the California Supreme Court in the case of: 
Mitchell, et al vs. Walker, 
a 1956 case in 295 P. (2d) 90. 
In the latter case the C'ourt held that it was unneces-
sary to decide whether the act in question was legislative 
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and decided the case on another point. It did, however, ap-
prove the decisions as laid down in the Alhambra and City 
of San Francisco cases above cited. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it will be noted that the majority of the 
cases holding ordinances dealing with raises of salaries of 
public officers to be legislative, are from our western states 
such as North Dakota and South Dakota, Texas, Washing-
ton, and California. These cases also deal with cities oper-
ating under the city charter plan of government, and we 
feel that inasmuch as our Supreme Court has already taken 
a liberal stand with respect to the powers reserved under 
the initiative and referendum law that the logical decision 
in this case should be to hold that the ordinance now before 
this Court deals with legislative matters and is therefore 
subject 1Jo the initiative and referendum laws of this State. 
Respectfully submi,ted, 
ARNOLD C. RO·YLANCE 
ELMER L. TERRY 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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